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Contracts-Smith v. Ford Motor Company: Limitation on a
Franchisor's Right To Interfere with Contracts Between a Franchisee and an Employee
The franchise' is an odd legal animal: the product of immense
economic power and technical knowledge on one side and entrepreneurial desire and investment ability on the other.' As a result a
3
franchisor has a great deal of power over a franchisee's operations.
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Smith v. Ford Motor
C0.4 held that there were limits to the power that a franchisor, Ford,
could exert over its franchisee, Cloverdale Ford, under a claim by Ford
of legal right to interfere with a contract between a franchisee and an
employee. Essentially, Ford could not procure the termination of
Cloverdale's general manager without good cause.
The claim of legal right has long been a sufficient defense in North
Carolina to claims of tortious inducement of breach of contract.5 Smith
v. Ford Motor Co. signifies an important encouragement to claims of
tortious inducement by marking a departure from automatic dismissal
when a defense of legal right is entered and by increasing judicial
inquiry into the merits of such a defense.
In Smith Ford Motor Company had a terminable at will franchise
1. Attempts to define "franchising" have not resulted in a consensus. See, e.g.,
Fels, Franchising; Legal Problems and the Business Framework of Reference-An
Overview, in Tm FRANcHsIING SoUrcnBOOK 3-9 (J. McCord ed. 1970); McGuire, The
Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 215 n.1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as McGuire].
12. The imbalance is fostered by the fact that the franchisee alone has made the
necessary capital investment; the franchisor has "nothing to lose." See Brown, Franchising: Fraud, Concealment and Full Disclosure, 33 Omo ST. L.J. 517, 518-19 & n.13
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Franchising]. For a full discussion of automobile dealer
franchises, see Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kessler].
3. Dealer vulnerability in this situation has been traced to the comparatively weak
bargaining power and the "anomalous legal classification of the manufacturer-dealer
relationship." Geilhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L. 465, 467-68. It is reinforced by policies such as those
exposed in H. BROWN, FRANCHsNG, Tmn Fo TmE TRJusnNG (1972). 'The second
largest auto factory guarantees the result of all conferences between its highly trained
executives and the individual dealer by barring any talk whatsoever if the dealer appears
with his attorney." Franchising,supra note 2, at 546.
4. 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396
(1971); Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964). See generally note
24 infra,
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agreement with a reconstituted dealership known as Cloverdale Ford. 6
The previously failing franchise had become profitable since the
employment of a new general manager, Jack Smith. Cloverdale Ford,
the franchisee corporation, employed Smith as president and general
manager under a contract terminable at will by Cloverdale. Additionally, the Smith-Cloverdale contract permitted termination for cause if,
in the opinion of Ford Motor Company, Smith proved unsatisfactory
"from the standpoint of profits earned or the manner of operation of
the corporation." 7 Subsequently, Smith became active in the Ford
Dealer Alliance, an association of dealers interested in protecting their
position in factory-dealer transactions. Upon Ford's request Smith disaffiliated Cloverdale Ford from the Alliance, but refused to end his personal association with the organization. Ford exerted pressure
on Cloverdale, apparently threatening termination of the franchise.
Cloverdale responded by utilizing the at will clause in Smith's contract,
terminating his employment.
Smith instituted suit against Cloverdale Ford, its majority stockholders and Ford Motor Company. The court of appeals approved the
superior court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Cloverdale
Ford and its majority stockholders 0 but held that the allegations were
sufficient to state a claim against Ford Motor Company for tortious
inducement of breach of contract, despite Ford's assertion of a right
to interfere."
Liability for inducing breach of contract is founded in Roman law
in a master's action for the indirect injury done to him when his slave
was injured.' 2 The common law counterpart was an action in trespass
6. See § 17.(f) of the franchise agreement, 289 N.C. at 79, 221 S.E.2d at 287.
7. Id. at 82, 221 S.E.2d at 289.
8. 26 N.C. App. 191, 215 S.E.2d 376 (1975).
9. The dismissal was founded on the right of an employer to terminate an
employee whose contract allows for termination at will. This "blinders" attitude toward
the exercise of a termination right is also exhibited in cases of franchise termination.
"[Such right to terminate was not subject to question .. .because of motive, intent or
resultant detriment. . . . It is beyond the power of the judiciary to engraft conditions
upon the exercise of such a contractual right." Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp.
920, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
10. There has been discussion of piercing the corporate veil and holding corporate
officers and stockholders liable for any wrongful action. Avins, Liability for Inducing a
Corporationto Breach Its Contract,43 CORNELL LQ. 55, 55-58 (1957).
11. 289N.C. at 76, 221 S.E.2d at &5.
12. See Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARv. L Rav. 728
(1928) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter]; Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HAnv.
L. REv. 633 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Sayre]; Comment, Inducing Breach of
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for the loss of the services of a servant. 13 In 1853, the scope of liability

4
was emancipated from the master-servant limitation in Lumley v. Gye,1
which marked the emergence of liability for tortious inducement of
breach of contract.
The principle of liability for tortious inducement of breach of
contract was first recognized in North Carolina in 1874 in Haskins v.
Royster' 5 when the court imposed liability for inducing a servant to
leave his master. The principle was extended in Jones v. Stanley"'
when the theory in Haskins was extended to cover "every case where
one person maliciously persuades another to break any contract with
a third person. It is not confined to contracts for service."17
In 1939 the Restatement of Torts defined one who would be liable
for tortious inducement of breach of contract as "one who, without
a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with another, or (b) enter into or

continue a business relation with another.

...
8s Comment e pro-

vides that "the actor must have knowledge of the business expectancy
with which he is interfering."'" But it was not until Childress v.
Contract: Herein of Contracts Terminable at Will, 56 Nw. U.L. Rav. 391 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Inducing Breach].
13. See Inducing Breach, supra note 12,at 391.
14. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). The court recognized that the employee was
not a servant but liability was extended for inducement to breach any employment
contract, despite a lack of statutory support. See Sayre, supra note 12, at 667-68.
15. 70 N.C.601 (1874).
16. 76 N.C.355 (1877).
17. Id. at 356 (emphasis inoriginal). This extension to non-employment contracts
antedates the English extension by sixteen years. See Inducing Breach, supra note 12, at
393-94. The principle of liability for inducement of breach of contract did not meet
with continued receptivity. InSwain v.Johnson, 151 N.C.91, 65 S.E. 619 (1909), the
North Carolina Supreme Court repudiated Jones and limited Haskins to its facts; liability
for inducing breach was limited to the master-servant relationship and to situations in
which the means of procurement were tortious in themselves. Subsequent cases either
accepted the limitation of Haskins, as in Minton v. Early, 183 N.C. 199, 111 S.E. 347
(1922), or avoided the discredited principle and relied on doctrines such as unfair trade
practices, as in Smith v. Morganton Ice Co., 159 N.C. 151, 74 S.E. 961 (1912). The
discreditation was furthered in Gibson Land Auction Co. v. Brittain, 182 N.C. 676, 110
S.E. 82 (1921), in which the court said, "In all events, if the plaintiffs be entitled to
recover, they must recover in an action growing out of contract; and none has been
shown with the defendant." Id. at 677, 110 S.E. at 83 (emphasis added). This dictum
indicates a confusion between liability for breach of contract and liability for inducement
of breach of contract.
18. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 766(1) (1939). The 1969 tentative draft alters the
definition to "[olne who intentionally induces or otherwise intentionally causes a third
person not to perform a contract with another, other than a contract to marry ....
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 766 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
19. RmSTATEMENT OF TORTs § 766, comment e at 56 (1939).
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Abeles ° in 1954 that the North Carolina Supreme Court clearly
enunciated the essential elements of the tort in this state: (1) a valid
contract must exist between plaintiff and a third party;21 (2) defendant
must know that the contract existed; 2 (3) defendant must intentionally
induce the third party to breach; 23 (4) defendant must act without justification;24 and (5) the breach must cause plaintiff actual damages.2 3
20. 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
21. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. The requirement of a valid contract was at
issue in Henry v. Shore, 18 N.C. App. 463, 197 S.E.2d 270 (1973). An action for
inducement of breach of contract was barred because the oral contract for the transfer of
real estate was in violation of the Statute of Frauds. In Bums v. McFarland, 146 N.C.
382, 59 S.E. 1011 (1907), plaintiff's apparent abandonment of the contract estopped an
action based on inducement of breach of a valid contract. The recognition of the tort of
interference with prospective economic advantage in Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Placement Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140 S.E.2d 3 (1965), alleviated the necessity of proving
a contractual relationship in some cases. The tortious conduct interfered with a
relational interest. See generally Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rnv. 460, 1041
(1934). That relation can be contractual or pre-contractual. "Where the interference is
with a contract, the privileges to interfere are somewhat more limited than in the case of
interference with prospective dealings . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766,
comment b at 37 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
22. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. Notice and intent are linked. See Harper,
Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 873, 880-81 (1953). In
Morgan v. Smith, 77 N.C. 37 (1877), the court did not impose liability on a defendant
who hired plaintiff's employees because the requisite elements of notice and malicious
intent had not been proven. The exigency of defendant's notice of plaintiff's contract is
amply illustrated by the North Carolina court's response to the land and timber sales
cases: Bruton v. Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d 9 (1945), in which the contract to sell
was not duly registered; Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co., 227 N.C. 339,
42 S.E.2d 218 (1947), in which the contract to sell was registered; Eller.v. Arnold, 230
N.C. 418, 53 S.E.2d 266 (1949), in which the realtor's exclusive right to sell was not
registered; and Dulin v. Williams, 239 N.C. 33, 79 S.E.2d 213 (1953), in which a timber
deed was not registered. The court held in each case that only inducement of breach of
the registered contract was actionable. Registration was held to be equivalent to legal
notice.
23. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. The necessity of proving intentional
inducement is vital; North Carolina rejected negligent inducement of breach of contract
in Thompson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 165 N.C. 377, 81 S.E. 315 (1914). The element
of intent once required proof of malice as well. That requirement was altered by
Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647 (1945), in which the court refined
the definition of malice when it said, "The word 'malicious' used in referring to malicious
interference with formation of a contract does not import ill will, but refers to an
intereference with design of injury to plaintiff or gaining some advantage at his expense."
Id. at 506, 35 S.E.2d at 656. See also McElwee v. Blackwell, 94 N.C. 261 (1886).
24. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. Various grounds justify actions that would
otherwise create liability for inducement of breach of contract. Business competition
and absolute right are acceptable justifications when the defendant is furthering his own
interests. Protection of public health, morals and safety; disinterested advice; performance of duty; discipline and responsibility for the welfare of another; protection of
character or reputation; interference with marriage contracts; interference with racial
disputes; and interference prompted by patriotism are justifications when the defendant is
furthering interests other than his own. For a discussion of justification see Carpenter,
supra note 12, at 745-62; Note, Torts: Inducing Breach of Contract: Justifications, 27
COMNELL L. REv. 139 (1941). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 767 (Tent.
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Draft No. 14, 1969), dealing with factors that determine privilege. In the business
competition context, the interest of the actor or inducer is measured against the interest
of the plaintiff in the contract in order to determine whether the actor has been justified.
"If the act is done only for the protection of one of the actor's interests, it must be an
interest of a value greater than, or at least equal to, that of the interest invaded, or if the
interests are similar, the harm which the act is appropriate to prevent must be substantially equal to or greater than that which it is intended or likely to cause." Bohlen,
Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Property and Personality, 39
HARv. L. Rlv. 307, 314 (1926). See also Note, Interference with Contracts at Will-A
Problem of Public Policy, 25 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 73, 77-78 (1958). The justification of
lawful competition as a successful defense to liability for inducement of breach of
contract was introduced in Holder v. Atlantic Joint-Stock Land Bank, 208 N.C. 38, 178
S.E. 861 (1935). The justification was held to create an absolute right to interfere,
however malicious the motive. The competition did, however, have to be lawful, which
was not the case in Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E.2d 671 (1941), when
defendant was held liable for inducing the former owner of a laundry to breach his
noncompetition covenant with the present owner. The privilege of competition was
sharply cut back in Bryant v. Barber, 237 N.C. 480, 483, 75 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1953),
which held that the privilege did not justify interference with existing contractual
relationships. "If contracts otherwise binding are not secure from wrongful interference
by competitors, they offer little certainty in business relations, and it is security from
competition that often gives them value." Carolina Overall Corp. v. East Carolina
Linen Supply, Inc., 8 N.C. App. 528, 531, 174 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1970). This protection
of existing contracts, which is the law today, was approved in Moye V. Eure, 21 N.C.
App. 261, 204 S.E.2d 221, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 590, 205 S.E.2d 723 (1974). See also
Sayre, supra note 12, at 686.
In the case of a business competition defense, defendant's freedom to compete and
the societal interest in a competitive economic atmosphere are considered more important than any prospective economic advantage to plaintiff, but less important than the
protection of existing contracts. It was implicit in the holding in Holder v. Cannon Mfg.
Co., 138 N.C. 308, 50 S.E. 681 (1905), that an employment contract at will did not
create a protectible right at all. The treatment of terminable at will contracts has
changed since Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
The most common justification in North Carolina case law is the defense of acting
under legal right. The defense of legal right or absolute right is a complete defense,
whereas the defense of competition is a qualified privilege exercisable only under
certain conditions. See generally Holmes, Privilege,Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1894). Insulation from liability resulted in Biggers v. Matthews, 147 N.C. 299, 61
S.E. 55 (1908), when the court issued the following broad dictum about an absolute right
to interfere: "If a person does that which he has a legal right to do, violating no legal
duty or obligation, the motive which prompts him is immaterial." Id. at '302, 61 S.E. at
57. The tentative draft of the second Restatement indicates a different attitude.
Although "[lll will on the part of the actor toward the person harmed is not an essential
condition of liability . .. [t]he presence or absence of ill will . . . may clarify the
purposes of the actor's conduct and may be, accordingly, an important factor in
determining the existence or non-existence of privilege." REsTATEMENT (SE oND) or
ToRs § 766, comment r at 48-49 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969). See also note 23 supra.
Biggers' dictum was followed in Bell v. Danzer, 187 N.C. 224, 121 S.E. 448 (1924), then
in Elvington v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 191 N.C. 515, '132 S.E. 274 (1926), and was
extended in Beane v. Weiman Co., 5 N.C. App. 279, 168 S.E.2d 233 (1969), when an
employee was found to have a legitimate right to announce that his continued employment was conditioned on the firing of another employee of whose activities he did not
approve. "Insider" status, which was invoked by the Ford Motor Company in Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., is apparently a legal right acquired through a contractual or fiduciary
relationship.
25. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 182. There is a controversy in many jurisdictions over the appropriate measure of damages. See generally Commont, Plaintiffs
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The dispute in Smith v. FordMotor Co.2 6 revolved around the acceptability of Ford's justification for interference: Ford's status as an
"insider" to Smith's employment contract with Cloverdale. The terms
"outsider" and "nonoutsider" were introduced in Childress v. Abeles,2 7
were never defined, but were applied nonetheless by the courts of
North Carolina in various situations.
Wilson v. McClenny 28 gave the court an opportunity to invoke the
immunity of "insiders" from liability for inducement of breach of contract; stockholders and directors were held privileged to cause the corporation to breach its contract with plaintiff. However, "the court did
qualify the privilege in dictum: "As either directors or stockholders,
they were privileged [per written agreement] purposely to cause the corporation not to renew plaintiff's contract as president if, in securing this
action, they did not employ any improper means and if -they acted in
29
good faith to protect the interests of the corporation."
The court of appeals in Sawyer v. Sawyer" suggested that had the
complaint sufficiently stated the elements of the tort, the stepmother
who had advised her stepdaughter and son-in-law to breach the terms
of a consent judgment would have been liable. The court determined that
the stepmother was an "outsider" as to her son-in-law even though the
plaintiff had conceded that she "was an interested party to the perfor-

mance of such consent judgment and a valuable consideration passed
to her, namely, the relinquishing by the present plaintiffs of their efforts

to set aside certain conveyances to the stepmother, defendant."31
Measure of Recovery for Tortious Inducement of Breach of Contract-Profits or
Losses?, 19 HASTINGS LJ. 1119 (1968); Note, Interference with Contractual Relations:
A Common Measure of Damages, 7 SANTA CLARA. LAW. 140 (1966). In McElwee v.
Blackwell, 94 N.C. 261 (1886), the court insisted upon actual damages before recovery
could be allowed. For that reason a new contract or novation is a bar to an action for
inducement of breach of the original contract according to the court in Fowler.v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 555, 124 S.E.2d 520 (1962).
26. 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976). The tentative draft of the second
Restatement extends a defense of privilege to "[olne who has a financial interest in the
business of another. . . if the actor (a) does not employ improper means, and (b) acts
to protect his interest from being prejudiced by the contract or relation." RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS § 769 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969). Comment a defines that
requisite business interest as an "interest in the nature of an investment. A part owner
of the business, as for example, a partner or stockholder, has at least such an interest.
But a bondholder or other creditor may also have it." Id., comment a, at 75-76.
27. 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954). "[Ain action in tort lies against an
outsider who knowingly, intentionally and unjustifiably induces one party to a contract to
breach it to the damage of the other party." Id. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181.
28. 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964).
29. Id. at 133, 136 S.E.2d at 578.
30. 4 N.C. App. 594, 167 S.E.2d 471 (1969).
31. Id, at 599, 167 S.E.2d at 475,
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The boundaries of the "insider"-"outsider" distinction are vital since
an "insider" has a privilege to induce breach of a contract to which he
is not a party, so long as he has a recognized interest.3 2 In Kelly v.
InternationalHarvester Co.3 the franchisor, Harvester, was held to be
an "insider" to the employment contract of plaintiff as general manager
for the franchisee corporation. The franchisor's "insider" status was
apparently the result of several conclusions: that Harvester had a "legal
right under the common law to protect and promote its own interests
in the conduct and success of [the franchisee's] business;"' 4 that
according to the franchise contract Harvester had the right to terminate
the franchise if "there is any change in the principal officers, directors,
management, or stock ownership which in the opinion of the Company
will effect a substantial change in the operation, management or control of the dealership" 5 and that such a change had occurred when
plaintiff had been hired by the franchisee as general manager without
Harvester's approval; that the franchise agreement giving Harvester
these rights antedated the employment contract; that Harvester could
reasonably believe that the employment of plaintiff as general manager
of this dealership would pull trade from a Harvester dealership in plaintiff's hometown nearby; and that Harvester was acting in good faith in
attempting to relocate plaintiff in a similar position elsewhere in the
state.
The language 'of Kelly v. International Harvester Co. was malleable enough to allow the court in Smith v. Ford Motor Co. to find the
claim sufficient or insufficient and still employ Harvester's language.
The court in Smith chose to read the Harvester result as mandated by
the cumulative effect of the conclusions above. International Harvester
was held to be an "insider" not simply because it was the franchisor
but because its actions were justified under the contract and were not
suspect as to intent. Although Ford Motor Company might have had
a "legal right. . to protect and promote its own interest in the con32. An "insider" has some of the same characteristics as "one who has a financial
interest" in Restatement language. See note 26 supra. "One who has a financial
interest" is privileged to act to protect his interest unless he employs improper means. If
proving "improper means" requires proof that the defendant acted in a manner that
would be tortious, the qualification is meaningless since liability would exist independent
of tortious inducement of breach of contract. The exact definition of "insider" is
illusory, but it seems to require more than a third party beneficiary relationship.
33. 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396 (1971).
34. Id. at 165, 179 S.E.2d at 402.

35. Id.at 164, 179 $.E.2d at 402.
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duct and success of [the franchisee's] business,"3 6 the result in Smith

indicates that this right alone is not now sufficient under North Carolina law to create an absolute right to interfere. The interference must
be for a specific and lawful purpose.
Ford Motor Company's rights under the contract 7 were restricted or
qualified in the same manner as International Harvester's.38 By the
language of Smith's employment contract with Cloverdale, Ford could
request the termination of Smith's employment only if he proved
unsatisfactory "from the standpoint of profits earned or the manner of
operation of the Corporation. '39 The court in Smith pointed out that
the expressed qualification "clearly indicates that dissatisfaction for the
'40
stated reasons was intended by the parties to be the only justification'
for Ford's interference. In Harvester there was a change in management that triggered Harvester's absolute right to interfere. In Smith
plaintiff was not only satisfactory from the standpoint of profits and
operation, he was exemplary, reversing the dealership from a losing
franchise into a profitable one.
The court in Harvester concluded that because the franchise agreement antedated the employment contract, parts of the agreement that
referred to operational policy and resulting franchisor rights were incorporated into plaintiff's employment contract. 41 The issue of incorporation of Cloverdale's franchise agreement into Smith's employment contract was not raised in Smith because the franchise agreement did not
antedate the employment contract."2 However, if the Harvester conclusion is extended, certain language in the franchise contract could
have borne on Ford's defense. The franchise agreement term that
Ford "solicits dealers to bring to its attention through their National
36. Id. at 165, 179 S.E.2d at 402.
37. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1970), which imposes upon Ford
an affirmative duty to police the use of its trademark, may consequently give Ford a
right to interfere that is not based upon contract. But since quality control and uniform
use of the trademark are the apparent goals of the provision, Ford should not be able to
justify interference with an efficient, productive operation.
38. Ford claimed an absolute right to interfere because of its status as an "insider."
Justice Holmes' caveat regarding absolute rights is interesting in light of Ford's claim:
"Mhe word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a
qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights
are qualified." American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358
(1921). An examination of the premise of Ford's right reveals it to be a qualified right.
39. 289 N.C. at 82, 221 S.E.2d at 289 (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. at 85, 221 S.E.2d at 291.
41. 278 N.C. at 165, 179 S.E.2d at 402.
42. 289 N.C. at 76, 221 S.E.2d at 285-86.
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Dealer Council organization any mutual dealer problems or complaints
as they arise ' 43 raised the obligation of Smith to utilize that forum
rather than the Ford Dealer Alliance. However, the use of the word
"solicits" and the "absence of any firm commitment on the part of Ford
' of the National Dealer Council indicate
to abide by the decisions"44
that the use of the grievance procedure set up by Ford is not, and
should not be, mandatory. Furthermore, Smith did disaffiliate the
franchisee, Cloverdale, as requested by Ford and maintained only his
individual membership in the Ford Dealer Alliance.
Other franchise agreement language allowed termination of the
franchise by Ford due to events controlled by the dealer, as in the case
of "disagreement between or among any persons named in paragraph
F [Smith and co-operator of the dealership and minority stockholder
of the franchise, Davis], which in the Company's opinion tends to
affect adversely the operation or business of the Dealer . . .
Even with incorporation, Ford should have been unable to justify its
interference with reference to this language. Although Davis would
have succeeded to Smith's stock interest upon termination of Smith's
employment, 40 Smith did not join Davis as a defendant and no allegation of disagreement between Smith and Davis was made. Furthermore, this right to terminate the franchise was restricted to situations
in which Ford reasonably believed the dealership was adversely
affected. Such a belief in view of increased profits and operational
stability would have been unreasonable.
It is clear that, aside from the disputed lack of justification, Smith
alleged a prima facie case of tortious inducement of breach of contract.
A valid contract clearly existed and was offered in support of the allegation.4 7 Ford did not dispute that it had the requisite knowledge of
the existence of Smith's employment contract; plaintiff as president of
the corporation, Cloverdale, signed the franchise agreement.4 Plaintiff alleged that when Ford learned of plaintiff's continued association
with the Ford Dealer Alliance, "it 'wrongfully, maliciously, and unlawfully exerted pressure' upon the stockholders and directors of Cloverdale to terminate the plaintiff's employment." 49 The resulting dam43. Id. at 76, 221 S.E.2d at 286.
44. Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. INn. & COM. L. Rav. 757,
815 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
45. 289 N.C. at 78, 221 S.E.2d at 286-87.
46. Id. at 82, 221 S.E.2d at 289.
47. Id. at 75-76, 221 S.E.2d at 285.
48. Id. at 77, 221 S.E.2d at 285-86.
49. Id. at 74, 221 S.E.2d at 284.
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ages were at least the loss of the right to compensation. Except
insofar as plaintiff alleged that the interference was "unlawful," there
was no allegation that defendant acted without justification. The court
apparently has modified Childress5" by completely converting the justification obstacle to an affirmative defense, to be pleaded and proven by
the defendant. 5 '
The analogy of the Ford Dealer Alliance to early labor unions is difficult to avoid.5 Ford backs the National Dealer Council as the grievance and bargaining panel in much the same way industrial employers

once supported company unions whose allegiances, at best, were split.53
Those who disagree with the policy are terminated.5" When "a third
party induced an employer to dismiss an employee before the expiration of his contract term of employment because the employee failed
' 55
to support the cause of union labor[, r]ecovery was permitted."
Essentially the same situation occurred in Smith when Ford procured
the termination of Smith because he supported a collective bargaining
unit. Had Ford been allowed to claim the protection of an absolute

right of a franchisor to interfere, the prohibition against collective association would be as complete as in the days of "yellowdog" contracts
for workers.5"
50. 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954). See note 27 supra.
51. The plaintiff put forth a prima facie case without alleging lack of justification;
the burden of proving justification rests with the defendant. Berry v. Donovan, 188
Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905).
52. For a full discussion of the labor law aspects and implications, see McGuire,
note 1 supra.
53. Company unions were disallowed under § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970). Even company established grievance
boards, similar to the Ford Dealer Council, were disallowed. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
54. The practice of terminating dissenters was not new to Ford. During the
depression in the 1930's, Ford instituted a controversial growth program:
Fresh dealers were given contracts in droves. Experienced agents who opposed the new policies and spoke their minds frankly were replaced as rapidly
as possible. Stressing the importance of weeding out "undesirables," the company reminded branch managers of their wide powers in cancelling franchises.
NEvINs & HILL, FoRD: EXPANSION AND CHALLENGE 1915-1933 (1957), quoted in
Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those
Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System,
1965 Wis. L. RFv. 483, 497 [hereinafter cited as Macaulay].
55. Weyrauch, Third Parties and the Contract Relationship, 32 BRoOKLYN L. Rnv.
29, 45 (1951) discussing Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal
dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905). See also R & W Hat Shop, Inc. v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1,
118 A. 55 (1922).
56. A yellowdog contract is an employment contract wherein the employee agrees
to refrain from labor union membership and collective activity. An example of such a
contract is contained in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
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The same equities that favored collective bargaining for labor in the
past support increased power for franchisees now. 5 One litigator who
represents franchisees has suggested collective activity by franchisees
as a protective measure against the disparate economic power of
franchisors:
Franchisees and their attorneys should meet with other franchisees
to ascertain franchisor's activities involving: (a) unfair or deceptive
acts or practices; (b) discriminatory practices; (c) price-maintenance policies; (d) territorial, customer or other illegal restrictions; and (e) other conduct that may be illegal under antitrust
and otner laws 8s
A franchisor such as Ford Motor Company who disapproves of franchisees' collective activity often has the convincing power of a termination at will clause in the franchise agreement to persuade the franchisee
not to participate in groups such as the Alliance. 9
Until franchisees are accorded the same rights and protections as
workers to associate collectively, franchisors can abuse their massive
economic power6° to diffuse any internal opposition. 6 ' Massachusetts
has met the need with the Franchising Fair Dealing Statute, section ten
57. "Through their dominant economic position, the manufacturers have employed
the franchise, a 'one-sided document which is neither contract, license or agreement,' to
gain maximum control over the management of the dealers' business without corresponding 'legal' responsibility." Kessler, supra note 2, at 1138.
58. Hammond, Litigation Techniques in Representing Franchises,in FRAwcriSmN:
SEcoND GENEnTION PROBLEMS 80 (Practising Law Institute 1969).
59. The breadth of termination at will clauses is discussed in Comment, Franchise
Regulation: Ohio Considers Legislation to Protect the Franchisee, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 643,
664-72 (1972). Automobile dealers have some protection under the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970). But, partly because the Act
requires the difficult proof of coercion, there have been few successful actions by
terminated dealers. Macaulay, supra note 54, at 742-43 (Table 2). For the general lack
of success under the Act, see id. at 741-89.
60. 'The dealers are . . . economic dependents of the company whose cars they
sell ....
... Fmhe economic power of Ford over its dealers is so great that dealers who
desperately need Ford cars will be helpless to resist Ford's 'influence' and 'persuasion,'
whether legalistically called 'coercion' or not." Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335
U.S. 303, 323, 325 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting). The economic resources of the
franchisor are also available to prolong litigation, "thereby requiring franchisees to suffer
substantial legal fees" which few can afford. H. BROWN, FRANcHInsNo, TRAP FOR THE
TRUSTNG 95 (1969). "One of the biggest strengths the franchisor has over the
franchisee is the . . . franchisee can't sue-it costs too much." Statement of David
Slater, President of Mutual Franchise Corp., Boston Globe, Feb. 18, 1970, at 68, cols. 18.
61. An injunction against termination of franchises was allowed to stand because
the terminations were intended to harass the leaders of class action litigation. Franchis.
ing, supra note 2, at 544 n.105, discussing In re International House of Pancakes
Franchise Litigation, 331 F. Supp. 556 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1971).
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of which provides: 'Every franchisee shall have the right of free asso-

ciation with other franchisees for any lawful purpose."8 2 Washington,es

Vermont,64 New Jersey65 and Pennsylvania 6 6 also have responded
legislatively to the need to equalize the balance of power; however,

these statutes usually do not provide effective sanctions.6"

The

Washington Franchise Act, for example, "merely invalidates 'yellow-

in franchise contracts, [therefore] it accomplishes very
dog' provisions
little. ' 08
Ford Motor Company's hostility toward the Ford Dealer Alliance and

toward Smith as a member of the Alliance is the unspoken issue in the
case.

The presence of malice does not rebut a privilege to procure

breach of contract in North Carolina. Although plaintiff had properly
alleged the elements of tortious inducement of breach of contract, the
lower courts were restrained from imposing liability if Ford interfered

under a legal right, regardless of information or intimation about Ford's
motives."9

Invocation of "insider" status in answer to the complaint

had been sufficient to establish the legal right and to support a motion
to dismiss.

Although the different result in Smith heralds judicial

62. MASS. Gm. LAws ANN. Ch. 93B, § 10 (1975). Massachusetts did not enact
other provisions that would have provided franchisees with a statutory right to bargain
collectively and with procedural protections of the State Labor Relations Act. See text
of the proposed Franchise Fair Dealing Act in THE FRANcmSiNG SoURcEBooK 211 (J.
McCord ed. 1970). For a complete discussion of the proposed Act by its author, see
Brown, supra note 44.
63. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2) (a) (Supp. 1974).
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4080 (Supp. 1975).
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(b) (Supp. 1975).
66. The Pennsylvania statute protects dealers of gasoline, petroleum products and
motor vehicle accessories. Act No. 126 (Nov. 26, 1975), § 4(1), [1975] 3 Pa. Leg.
Serv. 362.
67. 'The [Washington] statute does not actually guarantee the right of franchisees
to associate for any purpose. If franchisees were organized to bargain collectively with
the franchisor or to set retail prices, hours and the like, they could well be in violation of
federal antitrust laws." Chisum, State Regulation of Franchising: The Washington
Experience, 48 WAsH. L. RV. 291, 371 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Chisum]. If the
National Labor Relations Act was applicable to all franchise relationships, sanctions
would exist for franchisor abuse of franchisee rights. For a discussion of the possible
applicability, see McGuire, supra note 1, at 227-49 and Fels, Agency Problems, in
BusINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEmS OF THE FRANcmsE 113-18 (J. McCord & I. Cohen eds.
1968).
68. Chisum, supra note 67, at 371.
69. There have been cases in other jurisdictions in which the courts have expressed
concern over the means of inducement. E.g., Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 A.
600 (1913). "[Clertain bounds must be set to the use of means . . . if a decent regard
for the rights of others is to be preserved and the public welfare conserved." Id. at 649,
86 A. at 603. See generally Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1894).
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recognition of a qualified "insider" status, it may be mandated by the
judicial response to the injustice of allowing Ford's malicious inhibition
of Smith's personal right of association. The tort remedy is inadequate
in several ways. It does not adapt easily to the franchise in which the
"inducer" has a contractual relationship with the parties. It does not
protect a franchisee from "lawful" but malicious interference. Without
an element of malice, punitive damages are out of reach. In all, the
franchise agreement allows the knowledgeable franchisor an opportunity to contract for an absolute right, and the remedy is insufficient to
deter franchisor abuses.
Protective legislation similar to the Massachusetts statute should be
enacted in North Carolina."0 A terminable at will clause in a franchise
contract affords the parties an absolute right to terminate. Neither the
hardship that the clause works nor its unconscionability is considered
because franchise contracts do not seem to provoke the same judicial
protectiveness as standardized contracts.'
Furthermore, there is the
possibility of no remedy under North Carolina tort law because the
exercise of a legal right cannot result in liability regardless of motive.
Smith v. Ford Motor Co. allows the franchisee and his employee easier
access to a tort remedy but does not prevent Ford and other franchisors
from simply increasing their power, their "insider" status, in future
franchise agreements. The disparate power the franchise contract puts
in the hands of the franchisors must be balanced. Legislative recognition of the rights of franchisees and their employees72 would protect
70. Current North Carolina automobile franchise legislation is limited to licensing
procedures and termination requirements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 to -308
(1975). Although at least one writer believes that "[e]nforcement of minimum standards of fairness is not such an innovative step that it can be taken only as an overriding
matter of public policy or after legislative mandate," Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract
Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 468, the pervasiveness of the justification defense in North Carolina, with little attention to "minimum
standards of fairness," underlines the need for a statutory remedy to franchisor abuses in
this state. Corrective legislation should respond to this inadequacy as well as to other
inequities prevalent in franchise relationships. See generally Student Symposium" The
Franchise Relationship-Abuses and Remedies, 33 OHno ST. L.J. 641-742 (1972).
71. Gellhorn, supra note 70, at 468. A factor which limitg judicial intervention is
the fact that the complex controls asserted in franchise agreements defy explication by
general practioners and rigid evaluation by most judges. H. BROWN, PRANCHISING, TRAP
FoR THE ThusriNo 95 (1969).
72. For single distributor franchise arrangements it may not be vital to provide
franchisee employees with statutory protections, but in "the larger franchise enterprises,
[a] definitional problem usually lies in determining whether the franchisor is unrelated
to the franchisee's employees, or whether he is a joint employer of them." McGuire,
supra note 1, at 230.
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North Carolina businessmen who associate themselves with national
franchisors and would provide the North Carolina courts with an ascertainable standard by which to scrutinize franchisor abuses.
ELIZABETH ANANIA

Family Law-Constitutional Right of Privacy: The Father in the
Delivery Room
Eleven years ago in Griswold v. Connecticut1 the United States
Supreme Court gave full constitutional recognition to a broad and
fundamental realm of protected human conduct. This conflux of rights
was termed generally by the Court as the right of "privacy."'2 With the
source of this newly developed right ambiguously stated and its scope
extremely uncertain, lower courts have had little guidance in determining the bounds of its practical application. In the recent case of
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital' Judge John Paul Stevens of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (now Justice
Stevens of the United States Supreme Court) was presented with the
problems of determining the breadth of the right to privacy and the
limits placed upon it by countervailing societal interests. At stake were
the important, if not fundamental, rights of a father, mother and doctor 4
in having the father present in the delivery room at childbirth.5 The
court, unwilling to entangle itself in a medical dispute,6 held that the
parents' interest in having the father present was of insufficient magnitude to invalidate hospital regulations forbidding fathers from entering
the delivery room.'
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Id. at 484.
3.

523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).

4. Plaintiffs argued that the hospital regulations improperly restricted their doctors' rights to practice medicine. Although the trial court found no standing in plaintiffs
to assert their doctors' rights, the court of appeals found standing under Griswold in
which a doctor was allowed to assert his patient's rights. The appellate court ruled that
since plaintiffs had no protected rights in themselves they had no greater claim when
standing in their doctors' stead. Id. at 721-22 & n.23.
5. Id. at 717.
6. Id. at 721.
7. Id.

